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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 14-4787 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHRISTIAN DIOR WOMACK, a/k/a Gucci Prada 
 
Christian Womack, 
 
   Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-13-cr-00206-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 4, 2016 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  April 7, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Christian Dior Womack appeals the District Court’s judgment of sentence 
following his pleas of guilty to three counts of sex trafficking by force in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1591. We will affirm.  
I 
 Between 2012 and 2013, Womack and his paramour, Rashidah Brice, recruited 
three women into prostitution, advertised them without their consent on a website known 
to facilitate prostitution, and transported them against their will across several mid-
Atlantic states in furtherance of their illicit scheme. One of the victims was a minor. 
 A violent and intimidating man, Womack plied his victims with drugs, threatened 
their lives and the lives of their family members, held a gun to their heads, and beat them 
into submission. On one occasion, he attempted to rape a victim after she rebuffed his 
sexual advances. Another time, he and Brice forced their minor victim to have sex with 
approximately 15 different men in one night. 
 In addition to the significant physical harm Womack inflicted on the three women, 
he caused immeasurable emotional harm. His minor victim had to spend a year apart from 
her family at an inpatient treatment center for teenage victims of sexual abuse. She 
testified that the experience has “changed [her] life” by limiting her ability to enter into 
new relationships and that she remains “haunted by the feeling of being ‘unclean’ and 
‘impure.’” Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) at 12, ¶ 43. Another victim testified 
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that she has nightmares and that her relationships with family members have been 
adversely affected. 
 In April 2013, a grand jury indicted both Womack and Brice with one count of sex 
trafficking of a minor by force and two counts of sex trafficking of an adult by force. 18 
U.S.C. § 1591. Brice pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 185 months’ incarceration. 
Womack filed multiple pro se motions to dismiss the indictment, a motion for a 
restraining order against the prosecutor, and a motion to address fraud on the court. All 
were denied. On July 24, 2014—the day his trial was scheduled to begin—Womack 
pleaded guilty to all counts. 
 Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Womack’s total offense level was 
45 and his criminal history category was IV, yielding a Guidelines range of life 
imprisonment, largely because his offense level was “literally and figuratively off the 
charts.” App. 39. Womack did not object to the District Court’s calculation of his 
Guidelines range, but he did request a downward variance. 
  At the sentencing hearing, the District Court asked the prosecutor why a 
substantial sentence, such as a 30-year prison term, would not be “sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary” to punish Womack. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The prosecutor 
responded that a life sentence was necessary to protect the public given the violent nature 
of his crimes, the number and age of his victims, and his history of recidivism. 
The District Court then recognized that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2) mandates a 
Guidelines sentence for those, like Womack, who are convicted of sexual offenses 
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involving minors. As the Court rightly noted, however: “despite this language . . . Booker 
trumps . . . [and the Court has] the discretion to go outside of the guidelines.” App. 70. 
The sentencing judge emphasized: “I do retain discretion under Booker. So that’s how 
I’m going to look at it.” App. 71.  
 The Court then analyzed Womack’s crimes and personal circumstances. It found 
that “short of homicide [Womack’s offenses] couldn’t be more serious” and that his 
record included “12 prior convictions including juveniles,” several of which involved 
violence or threats of violence. App. 72. The Court also noted Womack’s mental health, 
family background, and the 185-month sentence Brice received. After giving these factors 
and the Guidelines “very, very careful consideration,” the Court stated: 
For what it’s worth, and it’s really not worth much, I personally don’t think 
that a life sentence is appropriate and perhaps that’s because I’m from the 
old school where I equate life sentences where there’s a loss of life and 
there hasn’t been a loss of life here. But that is not my job. I took an oath, 
and my oath was to apply the law. The law tells me that the guideline range 
here is life. . . . So the only way I’m obligated under the law to give great 
deference to that recommendation of the sentencing commission and 
Congress, the only way I can deviate from that is if there are reasonable 
bases for me to vary. 
 
App. 74–75. The Court then considered and rejected Womack’s four arguments in 
support of a downward variance, concluding: 
[W]eighing all those factors together, and giving the defendant every single benefit 
of the doubt, I can’t in good conscience conclude that these are appropriate legal 
bases for a variance. And as much as I do not personally want to do this, the law in 
my view, requires that I impose a life sentence and that is my sentence.  
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App. 77. Womack filed this timely appeal.1   
II 
 Womack’s principal argument on appeal is that the District Court committed 
procedural error at sentencing. Because Womack neither objected to the District Court’s 
calculation of his Guidelines range nor otherwise objected to the process by which the 
Court sentenced him, we review this argument for plain error. United States v. Flores-
Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Our review of 
the record leads us to conclude that the District Court committed neither plain error nor 
any error at all.  
 Womack first claims the District Court relegated its own judgment to that of the 
United States Sentencing Commission and Congress. It did so, he argues, by presuming 
that a within-Guidelines sentence was reasonable instead of exercising independent 
judgment as required by clearly established federal law. See, e.g., Nelson v. United States, 
555 U.S. 350 (2009). He contends further that the Court’s failure to explain why a life 
sentence was “not greater than necessary” as required by § 3553(a) underscores the 
unreasonableness of its process. 
 Counsel for Womack does a good job citing discrete statements made by the judge 
at sentencing that, if taken in isolation, evince a lack of understanding about the Court’s 
                                                 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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power to vary below the range established by the Guidelines. For example, the judge said 
that he “personally [doesn’t] believe that a life sentence is appropriate” for Womack 
because of his “old school” view that life sentences are appropriate only when “there’s 
[been] a loss of life.” App. 74. The trial judge also said he was “obligated” to give “great 
deference” to the Guidelines and that “the only way [he could] deviate” from them was to 
find a “reasonable bas[i]s” to do so. Womack Br. 12 (quoting App. 75). Womack 
construes these words as an unlawful presumption in favor of the Guidelines, Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007), and blames that presumption for the Court’s 
mistaken belief that it was “require[d] . . . [to] impose a life sentence.” App. 77. 
 As persuasive as Womack’s arguments may be when the sentencing judge’s Janus-
like statements are considered in isolation, they ultimately fail to persuade. We review the 
sentencing transcript in its entirety, and when the District Court’s statements are 
considered in context, they demonstrate that the trial judge knew the Guidelines were 
advisory, applied the relevant factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and imposed a sentence he 
deemed appropriate under the law of the land.  The Court’s closing remarks are 
instructive: 
[W]eighing all those factors together, and giving the defendant every single 
benefit of the doubt, I can’t in good conscience conclude that these are 
appropriate legal bases for a variance. And as much as I do not personally 
want to do this, the law in my view, requires that I impose a life sentence 
and that is my sentence.  
 
App. 77 (emphasis added).  
 In sum, as the Government persuasively argued: “if the sentence were up to [the 
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trial judge] alone, he would not apply a life sentence; but he is a judge who is required to 
decide the appropriate sentence based on factors decreed by statute, and those factors 
include the guideline range.” Br. at 23. So constrained, the trial judge properly refused to 
allow personal predilection to trump sober legal judgment. Accordingly, there was no 
procedural error. 
III 
 Womack next challenges his sentence on substantive grounds. A sentence is 
substantively unreasonable only if “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed 
the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Womack fails to 
meet this exacting standard.  
 In seeking to invalidate his within-Guidelines sentence, Womack offers several 
mitigating factors: (1) he did not severely hurt or kill any of his victims; (2) two of the 
victims never actually engaged in prostitution; (3) his “minor” victim was nearly 18 and 
lived on her own; (4) his life sentence was the result of five upward adjustments under the 
Guidelines; (5) his criminal record included relatively minor offenses; (6) he suffered 
from mental health issues; and (7) the PSR suggested that a sentence of less than life may 
be appropriate. Womack cites our decision in United States v. Olhovsky to argue that no 
rational judge could conclude that he deserves to spend the rest of his life in prison. 562 
F.3d 530, 553 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 As for Womack’s factual arguments, the record reflects that the District Court took 
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full cognizance of all of the mitigating factors he proffered and it is not our place to re-
weigh them on appeal. Regarding his legal theory, Olhovsky doesn’t carry the day for 
Womack because that case involved procedural unreasonableness in addition to 
substantive unreasonableness. 562 F.3d at 553. Having explained why there was no 
procedural error in this case, we must evaluate the substance of Womack’s sentence on its 
own terms. Under that deferential standard, we conclude that the District Court did not err 
when it sentenced Womack within the Guidelines range for crimes that the Court aptly 
found to be of a “heinous horrible horrific nature.” App. 71. 
IV 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence.  
